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with  Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae and  Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae in pig
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2002, 43, 145-156. – The objective of the study was to identify risk factors for reintro-
duction of Actinobacillus pleuopneumoniaeand Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae(enzootic
pneumonia) onto pig farms in areas in Switzerland that were involved in an eradication
programme from 1996 to 1999  and to assess the role of dealers in relation to these re-
infections. The study was based on the comparison of pig farms that were reinfected in
the year 2000 (cases) and pig farms that remained uninfected in the same area (controls).
Additionally, data were collected from Swiss pig dealers and transport companies.
Out of a total of 3983 farms, 107 farms were reinfected in the year 2000. The incidences
were 0.1% for Actinobacillus pleuopneumoniae and 2.6% for Mycoplasma hyopneumo-
niae (enzootic pneumonia). Compared to reinfection rates prior to the eradication pro-
gramme, this is a considerable reduction. Statistically signiﬁcant risk factors for the re-
infection were ’ﬁnishing farm’, ‘large mixed breeding-ﬁnishing farm’, ‘reinfected
neighbour’ and ‘parking site for pig transport vehicles close to the farm’. Pig farmers
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infection (protective factor). As long as infected and uninfected regions co-exist in
Switzerland, direct and indirect contact between farms, pig herds and slaughter sites via
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Introduction
In the early 1990s, it was shown that the major-
ity of speciﬁc pathogen-free (SPF) pig farms in
Switzerland were likely to be reinfected with
Enzootic Pneumonia (EP) and Actinobacillus
pleuropneumoniae (APP) as a result of aerosol
transmission from infected neighbouring farms
(Stärk et al. 1992). This supported results re-
ported earlier in Denmark (Thomson et al.
1992) and in the UK (Goodwin 1985). Thus, an
important transmission route of respiratoryagents acting in parallel to direct transmission
(Ross 1992) was documented. Protection
against airborne transmission cannot be
achieved by  individual farmers. As a result , the
Swiss Veterinary Services initiated a pro-
gramme of area-wide eradication of EP and
APP in all pig farms (Zimmermann et al. 2001).
A similar programme was also implemented in
Finland (Rautiainen et al. 2001). The control of
these  diseases is now compulsory for all com-
mercial and hobby pig farms in Switzerland.
The eradication campaign for EP involved par-
tial depopulation of breeding farms and com-
plete depopulation of ﬁnishing-only farms. Par-
tial depopulation is essentially based on an
interval of 14 days, where no pigs under 10
months of age are kept on the farm (Zimmer-
mann et al. 1989, Zimmermann 1990, Lium et
al. 1992, Baekbo et al. 1995).  The eradication
of APP involved  complete depopulation of  all
types of farms. For both respiratory diseases,
vaccination is forbidden in Switzerland.
After an exploratory investigation  using a spa-
tial simulation model (Laube et al. 1997) and a
pilot project in 2 well-deﬁned regions in
Switzerland (Masserey-Wullschleger & Maurer
1996), a nation-wide eradication programme
commenced  in August 1996. The district vet-
erinary ofﬁces annually expand the sanitations
into new deﬁned regions. The goal is to achieve
eradication by the end of 2004.
Following the eradication programme in the
ﬁrst region in 1996,  farms were  reinfected reg-
ularly. Although the reintroduction of My-
coplasma (M.). hyopneumoniae seemed to be
mainly associated with direct contact with in-
fected swine through trade, for many cases,  ob-
vious reasons for its reinfection were not
identiﬁed. The need for effective  biosecurity
measures on farms and during  the transport of
animals led to regulations being developed to
control  animal trade. Despite these  measures,
the risk of reinfection remained a threat for
SPF pig farms. Even after an extensive investi-
gation of all potential sources of infection on
these farms, some cases remained un-ex-
plained.
The study presented here was conducted with
the following objectives:
1. To undertake an epidemiological analysis of
the status of the area-wide eradication pro-
gramme.
2. To identify and quantify risk factors for
reinfections in those areas which had  com-
pleted the eradication programme for EP
and APP.
3. To recommend measures to prevent the rein-
troduction of infection.
Materials and methods
The study consisted of 2 parts: an observational
study of affected and control farms, and a sur-
vey of pig dealers and transport companies. The
observational study was designed as a case-
control study with an equal number of cases
and controls.
Farm recruitment
The study was conducted in 3 deﬁned regions in
the Cantons of Berne, Lucerne and Solothurn
where the eradication programme was under-
taken between 1996 and 1999. The population
at risk in these cantons consisted of 3,983 pig
farms. Of these, 2,373 (59.6%) farms were
members of the Swiss Pig Health Service
(SPHS), a programme comparable with SPF
programmes in other countries. Of the popula-
tion at risk, 1,207 (30.3%) were breeding
farms, 709 (17.8%) mixed breeding-ﬁnishing
farms and 2,067 (51.9%) ﬁnishing farms.
All farms in the deﬁned regions where  either
EP or APP was reintroduced between January 1
and December 31, 2000, were recruited as
cases. A farm was deﬁned as being reinfected if
at least 2 of the following criteria were present:
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microscopical lesions observed at slaughter or
isolation of M. hyopneumoniae by an indirect
immunoﬂuorescence test from lung tissue or A.
pleuropneumoniae Biovar 1, Serovar 2 by bac-
teriological analysis. Although the isolation of
either agent was sufﬁcient to classify a farm as
infected, additional criteria were required for
those cases where  isolation was  unsuccessful.
The suspected date of the reintroduction  of in-
fection, not the date of diagnosis, was used as a
reference date for the assessment of risk fac-
tors. Farms that were linked to a reinfected case
by the direct movement of animals were sero-
logically screened to identify possible further
cases. Detailed farm data of all case farms were
extracted from the SPHS database. The
database has data on farm health status pro-
vided by farmers, dealers, slaughterhouses and
veterinarians, as well as data collected during
farm visits by SPHS consultants. All members
of the SPHS and all farms in areas with ongo-
ing or completed eradication programmes are
included in this database. All data retrieved for
this study were double-checked by the principal
investigator (R. Hege). 
Farmers were contacted by phone to explain the
objectives of the study and to obtain their  con-
sent to participate in the study. A personal ap-
pointment was made to conduct an interview
concerning the reintroduction of infection on
the farm. All farmers whose farms were  rein-
fected before the study commenced in July
2000 were interviewed retrospectively (maxi-
mum time lag between infection and interview:
6 months). All other cases were visited as soon
as possible after the reintroduction of infection
was reported. All reinfected farms were visited
by the principal investigator (R. Hege) and all
pig farmers were interviewed between July 18,
2000 and March 14, 2001.
During the interview, a questionnaire was ﬁlled
out in the presence of the farm owner. This
questionnaire was developed in collaboration
with SPHS consultants to optimise the compre-
hension and quality of the questions.
Control farms were recruited from  the same ar-
eas as case farms. The selection of control
farms was undertaken  by random sampling.
For each case farm, a control farm was selected.
Case and control farms were not matched re-
garding region or any other criteria. These
farms were visited and farmers interviewed us-
ing the same questionnaire as for the case farms
except for the section regarding the details of
the reinfection (see below).
The questionnaire was divided into 4 sections:
General farm information (ID-number;
address; phone number; husbandry system;
number of breeding and ﬁnishing animals;
feeding; health status; dealer company; pig
transport company), 
chronological informationon the reinfec-
tion (date of suspicion; date of diagnosis; clini-
cal symptoms during this time; purchase of
pigs), 
environmental information (farm loca-
tion; topography; distance to the 4 nearest
neighbouring pig farms (measured on a map of
scale 1:25,000); how pigs were transported;
parking sites for transport vehicles; personal
contact with slaughterhouses or butcheries;
biosecurity measures), 
information on indirect factors (ammo-
nia concentration; dust load; exchange of agri-
cultural equipment; pets; rodents; wild pigs;
visitors).
The majority of the questions were closed ques-
tions, giving the opportunity to answer either
‘yes’ or ‘no’. For some questions, a choice of
possible answers was offered from  which one
had to be chosen. Some questions were de-
signed to assess  the farmer’s personal opinion
or to capture the subjective impression of the
interviewer (e.g. assessment of ammonia con-
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detected, score 2=ammonia smell detected,
score 3=high ammonia concentration causing
eye irritation).
The interview on the control farms was con-
ducted similarly except that all questions re-
garding the reinfection were not asked. All in-
terviews were conducted by the principal
investigator.
For the investigation of pathways of transmis-
sion for case farms, the categories "transmis-
sion by purchase of animals" and "transmission
by chronic, undetected infection" were based
on the data collected by the SPHS. In those
cases where there were neighbouring infected
herds  and other transmission pathways were
not identiﬁed, the category "air-borne transmis-
sion" was used as a tentative classiﬁcation. In
all remaining cases without infected neigh-
bours, the category "source unknown" was
used. 
Survey of pig dealers and transport companies
Data on all registered dealers and transport
companies in Switzerland were extracted from
the database of the SPHS. A questionnaire was
sent together with a covering letter explaining
the objectives of the study to all 212 companies.
After identiﬁcation and deletion of companies
that had ceased  business during  2000 or 2001,
the database was updated. Finally 158 dealers
and transport companies remained. All compa-
nies who did not respond to the ﬁrst mailing
were sent a reminder.
The questionnaire was divided into 6 sections:
General information (address; phone num-
ber; responsible person), 
logistics (number of transport vehicles and
company drivers; contractors), 
information on dealing activities (re-
gions; areas not included in the eradication pro-
gramme; non-SPF animals; number; time and
frequency of transport of piglets, sows, slaugh-
ter animals; criteria for  planning transport
routes; transport of other animals such as cattle,
horses, sheep, goats), 
biosecurity (clothing; changing room;
shower facilities; possibilities of changing the
route), 
cleansing and disinfection(control of hy-
giene status of the vehicles; contact with
slaughterhouses; butcheries and emergency
slaughter sites), 
transport vehicles (equipment such as
loading areas; loading ramps; the surface mate-
rial of ramps).
Data management and analysis
The data from both questionnaires were entered
into a database management system (Microsoft
Access) and then  imported into a statistical
software package (NCSS 2000, Number
Cruncher Statistical Systems, Kaysville, Utah).
A descriptive statistical analysis was con-
ducted. For the case-control data, each potential
risk factor was screened for signiﬁcant associa-
tion with reinfected farms. Associations be-
tween the outcome (reinfection) and continuous
data were tested using the Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test, whereas binomial data were tested
using the Chi-Square test. Associations were
expressed as odds ratios (OR) with their 95%
conﬁdence intervals (CI). Each variable with a
statistical signiﬁcance of p≤0.05 at the univari-
ate level was considered for multivariate analy-
sis. This cut-off level was chosen because of the
high number of variables with a value of p≤0.05
and the limited number of farms in the study. A
backward stepwise selection procedure with a
cutoff level of p=0.05 was used. One-way inter-
actions that were biologically plausible or for
which scientiﬁc evidence was available were
tested for signiﬁcance in the ﬁnal model.
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Case-control study
Out of a total of 3,983 farms at risk, 107 farms
were reinfected in the selected areas of the 3
Cantons during the year 2000. Fig. 1 provides
an overview of the location of the 3 Cantons
and the ratio of case  and control farms per dis-
trict. A total of 103 farms were infected with EP
and 4 farms with APP. This resulted in an an-
nual incidence of the reinfection of 2.6% for EP
and 0.1% for APP. In breeding farms the inci-
dence was 1.7% (20 farms), in mixed breeding-
ﬁnishing farms 2.4% (n=17) and in ﬁnishing
farms 3.4% (n=70). A total of 71% (n=76) of
the case farms were members of the SPHS,
29% (n=31) were not members.
Out of all reinfected ﬁnishing farms (n=75),
26.7% (n=20) operated an all-in/all-out system,
and 73.3% (n=55) restocked continuously. Due
to missing data in the SPHS database, some of
the denominators vary. Among 92 reinfected
herds with complete data,  pigs were coughing
in 77.2% (n=71) and gross lesions in lungs were
found at  slaughter-inspections in 83 out of 105
(79.0%) farms. The causative agents (M. hyop-
neumoniae or A. pleuropneumoniae) were iso-
lated in 86.7% (91 out of 105) of the case farms.
Obvious pathways leading to the reintroduction
of infection were identiﬁed in 74 (69.2%) cases.
The main reasons were: purchase of animals in
46 cases (43.0%), air-borne infection on 24
farms (22.4%), and chronic, undetected infec-
tion in 4 cases (3.7%). In 30.8% of  cases, a
pathway leading to the reintroduction of infec-
tion was not identiﬁed.
Each variable was compared individually with
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Figure 1. Map of districts included in a case-control study of pig farms regarding re-infections in respiratory-
disease-free areas in Switzerland.
The hatched areas in the total view of Switzerland represent the 3 Cantons of Berne, Lucerne and Solothurn.
The number in each district in the enlarged view shows the ratio of case farms to control farms.150 R. Hege et al.
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Table 1. Frequencies of farm characteristics in farms re-infected with respiratory diseases and control farms
as assessed during a case-control study conducted in Switzerland (only variables with p<0.2).
Variable description Cases (%), Controls (%), PO R n=107 n=107
Production system
Membership of Swiss Pig Health Service 71.0 82.2 0.052a) 0.5
Breeding farms 19.6 45.8 <0.001a) 0.3
Finishing-only farms 67.3 37.4 <0.001a) 3.4
Mixed breeding-ﬁnishing farm with at maximum
99 fattening pigs 4.7 15.0 0.011a) 0.3
Mixed breeding-ﬁnishing farm with at least
100 fattening pigs 8.4 1.9 0.030a) 4.8
Environment
Farms with exercise area or pasture 2.8 9.3 0.045a) 0.3
One additional re-infected neighbour n.a.b) n.a.b) <0.001a) 3.7
Transport route close to farm 66.4 47.7 0.006a) 2.2
Parking site for transport vehicles close to farm 21.5 4.7 <0.001a) 5.6
Distance to parking site ≤300 m 9.3 1.9 0.017a) 5.4
Veterinarian may enter the pig stable 63 81 0.009a) 0.5
Moderate smell of ammonia in the stable 30.6c) 9.9c) 0.053 1.9
Dust ﬁlm on window sills in the stable 12.2c) 5.0c) 0.066 2.7
An increased altitude of the farm location by 50 meters n.a.d) n.a.d) <0.001a) 0.7
Animal purchase practices
Pigs typically loaded before 0700 a.m. 73.8 44.9 <0.001a) 3.5
Pigs typically loaded between 0700 a.m. and noon. 22.4 54.2 <0.001a) 0.2
Pigs typically loaded between noon and 0800 p.m. 2.8 0.0 0.081 Not
calculable
Drivers of transport vehicles may enter the stable 32.7 24.3 0.173 1.5
Pig owner has complained about cleanliness of 11.2 0.9 0.002a) 13.4
transport vehicles
Farmers delivers pigs to the butcher himself 66.4 77.6 0.068 0.6
Farmer cleans his transport vehicle after being 43.9 55.1 0.101 0.6
at the butchery
Farmer disinfects his transport vehicle after 5.6 1.9 0.149 3.1
being at the slaughterhouse
Always the same animal suppliers 22.4 42.1 0.002a) 0.4
No supplier (closed farm) 21.2 18.2 0.529 1.2
Only 1 animal supplier 21.5 56.1 <0.001a) 0.2
2 or 3 animal suppliers 18.7 12.1 0.185 1.7
more than 3 animal suppliers 32.7 8.4 <0.001a) 5.3
a) Variables included in the logistic model.
b)n.a. = not applicable; mean value of cases = 0.5, mean value of controls = 0.1
c) Some farmers did not allow access to the pig stables. Here, the number of case farms was 98, the number of control farms
101.
d)mean (cases) = 541, mean (controls) = 554.respect to the outcome, that is,  if it was more
frequent in the case than in the control group.
The frequencies of farm characteristics for all
farms are presented in Table 1.
Since there were no missing values for the vari-
ables entered into the multivariate logistic
model, all 214 farms were  included in this
analysis (107 cases, 107 controls). The results
of the ﬁnal model are presented in Table 2.
There were no statistically signiﬁcant one-way
interactions for risk factor combinations. The
logistic regression showed an agreement be-
tween the predicted and the observed result for
77.5% for the control farms and 81.3% for the
case farms. The model’s ability to correctly
classify a farm was 79.4%.
Survey of dealers and transport companies
After the ﬁrst mailing, 42 (26.6%) responses
were received. Following a reminder, an addi-
tional 36 replies were obtained. Thus, out of
158 questionnaires, 78 (49.4%) were returned
completed. The denominator for all results
shown below was 78. The collected data were
analysed descriptively. Regarding general in-
formation of all respondents, 94% of the com-
panies owned the vehicles they used, while 24%
were working with contractors. In 37%, at least
one driver lived on a farm and in 19% owned
pigs himself.
Information on dealing activities provided an
indication of how extensive the activities of the
companies were. Out of all companies, 71%
were only active in one of the 26 Swiss cantons,
and 51% were limiting their activities to regions
involved in the eradication programme. Re-
garding age classes of animals, 63% were deal-
ing with sows and boars and 93% with ﬁnishing
pigs. Regarding combined animal transports,
48% were dealing with breeding and ﬁnishing
pigs. Only 14% of all companies had different
vehicles for breeding and ﬁnishing pigs.
In 45% of the companies, it was possible to
change pigs from one vehicle to another during
the pick-up run, and in 16%, trailers holding an-
imals were sometimes parked temporarily. Spe-
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Table 2. Final logistic model of risk factors for re-infection with respiratory diseases into farms (n=214) in
sanitised areas in Switzerland (R2=0.35).
Risk factors P OR 95% Cl
Type of pig production
Breeding farm - 1 -
Finishing farm <0.001 4.31 2.13 - 8.71
Mixed breeding-ﬁnishing farm with at least 
100 ﬁnishing pigs 0.009 10.12 1.80 - 56.77
Number of suppliers per unit
Number of suppliers <1 og >2 - 1 -
Only 1 animal supplier <0.001 0.17 0.08 - 0.36
Risk of air-borne transmission
No re-infected neighbour - 1 -
One additional re-infected neighbour 0.001 3.47 1.66 - 7.24
Pig transports
No parking site - 1 -
Parking site for transport vehicles close to the farm <0.001 9.28 2.67 - 32.23ciﬁc criteria for planning transport routes, for
example,  according to health status of the farm,
the distances involved and the number of pigs
transported, existed in 70% of the companies. A
visual hygiene check of their vehicles was con-
ducted in 58% of the companies.
Approximately 80% of respondents reported
that vehicles could be cleaned and disinfected
at the slaughterhouse, but only 41% were
checked by an employee of the slaughterhouse
before leaving the slaughterhouse. At but-
cheries, emergency slaughter locations and
knackeries, <25% of the vehicles were cleaned
and disinfected.
The data were analysed for small-scale compa-
nies and large-scale companies separately to
determine if there were statistically signiﬁcant
differences between the working practices of
one-man-companies compared to larger com-
panies. A small-scale company was deﬁned as
being a one-man-company owning just one
transport vehicle. Out of all questionnaires
ﬁlled in correctly, 39 (50%) came from small-
scale companies. 
Ten factors were statistically signiﬁcant at a
probability level of p≤0.05. One-man-compa-
nies owned an animal farm (p=0.010) or  pigs
(p=0.002) less often than large-scale compa-
nies. Their activities were more often limited to
one Canton (p<0.001) and more often in re-
gions participating in an eradication pro-
gramme (p=0.003). They were dealing less fre-
quently with sows and boars (p=0.041).
Regarding biosecurity measures, small-scale
companies rarely had any concept of planning
transport routes (p=0.014). They transported
other livestock in the pig transport vehicles
more often (p=0.025). During  transportation,
they were less likely to reload pigs (p<0.001) or
parking their trailers temporarily (p=0.012).
One-man-companies rarely provided a room
for changing the driver’s working clothes
(p=0.013).
Discussion
This case-control study showed that reinfec-
tions are a problem in areas where EP and APP
have been eradicated. In the 3 areas in Cantons
involved in this study, 107 out of 3,983 farms
were reinfected. In the past, reports of the Swiss
Pig Health Service demonstrated a steady an-
nual reinfection rate of 2-3% (Keller 1988,
Stärk 1991). Our data conﬁrm a decrease of the
risk of reinfection following eradication.
As in any observational study, this study is not
free from potential bias. Regarding misclassiﬁ-
cation of controls, farms may have been sub-
clinically infected with EP at the time when
they were visited and their data were collected.
Also, as tracing of contacts is often incomplete,
secondarily infected cases may have remained
undetected. However, we believe that this
would only involve a sporadic number of farms.
As this type of misclassiﬁcation would be non-
differential, it would result in an underestima-
tion of the odds ratios. Furthermore, it is known
from the Swiss Pig Health Service that the in-
formation provided by the farmer is often not
complete. Similarly, the data that we collected
could be affected by information bias. Farmers
from case farms could have looked  for an ex-
ternal cause of the reintroduction of infection
and therefore  make more pessimistic state-
ments regarding pig suppliers, dealers and
transport companies or visitors than farmers
from control farms. Additionally, disease detec-
tion on ﬁnishing farms may have been easier
because the likelihood and the intensity of
coughing is often greatest in growing-ﬁnishing
swine (Gardner & Hird 1990, Sheldrake et al.
1990,  Clark et al. 1991). A possible conse-
quence could be an overestimation of trade-re-
lated risk factors. Finally, because the participa-
tion of dealers and transport companies in the
study was not compulsory and the question-
naire was mailed out, the quality of the data
may not be equivalent to that obtained from a
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cases where  APP was reintroduced, the results
of this study are limited regarding this agent.
Consequently, the risk factors described here
are more relevant for EP reinfections.
The risk factors in this study are not new but
conﬁrm earlier work (Stärk 2000). Five vari-
ables were identiﬁed as important for the rein-
troduction of infection. Results from the logis-
tic model showed a 4 times higher risk for
ﬁnishing-only farms compared to breeding-
only farms. The effect of herd type was also
seen  in the difference between the incidence
rates for ﬁnishing-only and breeding-only
farms, (OR=2.08; CI 1.26-3.44). Finishing-
only farms had a higher risk of becoming rein-
fected. One reason for this is that ﬁnishing
farms are dependent on breeders for animal
supply. If a breeding farm is reinfected the risk
of infection for ﬁnishing farms purchasing ani-
mals from it is high. Thus, a  ﬂow of infection
from breeding to ﬁnishing herds may develop.
There are always 2 different transportation
routes for animals on a ﬁnishing farm, one to
the farm (i.e. from a breeder or  mixed breeder-
ﬁnisher) and one from the farm to the slaugh-
terhouse. Every purchase necessitates the trans-
portation of animals, and related factors
become important, e.g. dealing companies,
transport vehicles, drivers, other loaded ani-
mals.
The survey of dealers and transport companies
indicated that  in only 80% of the situations, ve-
hicles could be cleaned and disinfected at the
slaughterhouse. As a result drivers who do not
thoroughly clean and disinfect their vehicles
may pick up bacteria and spread them to other
farms. Comparing the incidence rates for
breeding-only and mixed breeding-ﬁnishing
farms in general, the study did not show any
signiﬁcant differences. However, the results do
indicate a signiﬁcantly higher risk for mixed
breeding-ﬁnishing farms with at least 100
growing-ﬁnishing pigs compared to breeding-
only farms. Mixed breeding-ﬁnishing farms
with a maximum of 99 growing-ﬁnishing pigs
did not show any difference to breeding-only
farms. The difference is likely to be due to the
fact that large mixed breeding-ﬁnishing farms
are exposed to many of the same risk factors for
ﬁnishing-only farms described above.
As reported in  the literature, multi-source pur-
chases are a risk factor (Stärk 2000). This study
did not distinguish between the different types
of purchases (e.g. breeding animals, piglets or
ﬁnishing pigs). Farms purchasing from one
only source were at less risk than farms with
other purchasing practices. Well established,
limited trading relationships appear to be ad-
vantageous regarding the risk of reinfection. In
contrast, having a closed farm  was not a statis-
tically signiﬁcant protective factor in this study
when compared to all other purchasing strate-
gies. One explanation may be that the variable
"number of suppliers" only accounts for "trade"
contacts associated with purchasing but not
selling pigs.
In contrast to APP, EP is often spread by air-
borne transmission (Goodwin 1985, Stärk et al.
1992, Thomson et al. 1992). Several potential
sources of aerosol transmission were identiﬁed
as risk factors in this study. If there were in-
fected neighbours present, reinfection was
more likely. To control air-borne transmission,
it is necessary to depopulate pig stables where
infection has been reintroduced as soon as pos-
sible. However, partial depopulation of a rein-
fected breeding farm takes time, often several
months, because all animals older than 10
months have to  develop an immune response in
order for partial depopulation to work (Zim-
mermann et al. 1989, Zimmermann 1990). In a
situation where an infected farm poses a signif-
icant risk to its SPF neighbours, total depopula-
tion rather than partial depopulation may have
to be employed. The importance of size and dis-
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other authors (Goodwin 1985,  Jorsal et al.
1988) was not observed in our study. However,
parking sites for transport vehicles close to pig
farms were found to be a risk factor. They may
act as a source from where aerosols can spread.
In this study, parking sites were at a distance
from between 10 and 2000 meters from a farm.
Based on the ﬁndings of this study, recommen-
dations for the prevention of reinfections can be
made at different levels. Newly introduced in-
fections, so called index cases, within SPF ar-
eas need to be detected as early as  possible.
However, the long incubation periods associ-
ated with M. hyopneumoniae and A. pleurop-
neumoniae hinders a prompt follow-up. With
the decreasing occurrence these pathogens and
the absence of severe clinical signs in pig reared
in hygienic environments, detection requires a
high level of  awareness of disease and  report-
ing of suspicious, even vague, clinical symp-
toms. This needs to be supported by checks rou-
tinely conducted at slaughter and continuing
clinical surveillance through farm visits. Fur-
thermore, serological screening may be applied
as described by Rautiainen et al.(2001). For ex-
ample, tests based on meat juice analysis at
slaughter may be particularly well suited to this
situation. All data should be entered into a reg-
istration system to enable epidemiological data
to be routinely updated. As the pig density in
Switzerland is unlikely to decrease in the next
few years, the risk of air-borne transmission can
only be reduced by minimising the number of
index cases and eliminating temporary aerosol
sources (e.g. parked trucks).
Some cases where infection was reintroduced
in this study may have been connected to chron-
ically infected breeding-only herds. Partial de-
population may not have been successful on
these farms or they may have been misclassiﬁed
initially as being not infected. The latter situa-
tion was also reported from the Finnish pro-
gramme (Rautiainen et al. 2001). This can oc-
cur, if the infection is still active in animals
older than 10 months of age remaining on the
farm. Where  the reintroduction of infection is
suspected or conﬁrmed, all infected pigs should
be removed from the particular farm. These
pigs should either be slaughtered or ﬁnished at
well-isolated locations. This will ensure the
rapid removal of infection sources and there-
fore the occurrence of secondary cases.
The transportation of pigs needs to be opti-
mised. Regarding the information collected
from dealers and transport companies, several
factors should be analysed further to derive rec-
ommendations for the prevention of index as
well as secondary cases. In the context of a na-
tion-wide eradication programme, the area in
which a dealing company is active is important.
As long as SPF  and non-SPF regions exist in
Switzerland, it is likely that spread of EP and
APP is facilitated by direct and indirect contact
between farms, pig herds and slaughter sites via
transport vehicles. The data collected in our
survey indicate that improvements are possible.
For example, the strategic planning of transport
routes and hygiene are likely to be  essential
components of the Swiss eradication pro-
gramme, contributing signiﬁcantly to its suc-
cess. Cleaning and disinfecting stables, loading
sites, transport vehicles and washing areas at
the slaughterhouses are basic measures for pre-
venting the spread of infection. Permanently
accessible areas to clean and disinfect transport
vehicles need to be provided at butcheries,
emergency slaughter sites and knackeries. To
plan transport routes and improve hygiene deal-
ers, producers, the Swiss Pig Health Service
and the Veterinary Services will all need to co-
operate closely.
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Sammendrag
Incidensen af reinfektioner med Mycoplasma hyo-
pneumoniae og Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae i
svinebesætninger beliggende i områder af Schweitz
fri for respirationsvejssygdomme - identiﬁkation og
kvantiﬁcering af risiko-faktorer.
Formålet med studiet var at identiﬁcere risikofaktorer
for reinfektion med Actinobacillus pleuropneumo-
niae og Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae (enzootisk
pneumoni) i områder af Schweiz, der var del i et sa-
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mere omsætteres rolle i forbindelse med disse rein-
fektioner. Undersøgelsen var baseret på sammen-
ligning af besætninger, der var reinﬁceret i år 2000
(cases) og svinebesætninger, der forblev ikke inﬁce-
ret (kontroller) i samme område. Desuden blev der
indsamlet data fra schweiziske omsættere af svin og
transportører.
Af i alt 3983 besætninger blev 107 besætninger rein-
ﬁceret i år 2000. Incidensen var 0,1% for Actinoba-
cillus pleuropneumoniae og 2,6% for Mycoplasma
hyopneumoniae (enzootisk pneumoni). Sammenlig-
net med reinfektionsraterne før saneringen er dette en
betydelig reduktion. Statistisk signiﬁkante risikofak-
torer for reinfektion var "slagtesvinebesætning",
"stor so og slagtesvinebesætning", "reinﬁceret nabo"
og "parkering af transportvogne til svin tæt ved be-
sætningen". Svinebesætninger, der indkøbte svin fra
én besætning pr. hold havde en lavere risiko for at in-
troducere infektion (beskyttende faktor). Så længe
inﬁcerede og ikke-inﬁcerede områder ﬁndes side om
side i Schweiz vil direkte og indirekte kontakt mel-
lem besætninger og mellem svinebesætninger og
slagtesteder via transportvogne være en vigtig kilde
til spredning af sygdom. Håndtering af risici, der er
forbundet med disse kontakttyper, er derfor særdeles
vigtigt. Undersøgelsen blandt omsættere indikerede
forskellige områder, som kunne forbedres, så som
strategisk planlægning af kørsels-ruter og desinfek-
tion af transportvogne.
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